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Paradox of Choice in a Mandatory Pension Savings 
System: Challenges for Australian Retirement Income 
Policy 
 
Abstract 
As the Australian pension system has become increasingly privatized and less regulated, 
decisions about the quantum and nature of pension investments have progressively shifted to 
pension fund members. This choice environment provides members with the ability to control 
their own pensions, but it also creates challenges for ensuring pension assets are managed in 
way that will maximize returns and, ultimately, retirement benefits. Government initiatives to 
address these challenges have principally focussed on disclosure and education and not on the 
more pervasive behavioural constraints that limit the effectiveness of the existing policy. We 
advocate policy solutions consistent with libertarian paternalism where the government 
provides a competitive choice environment, but actively intervenes to set suitable pension 
savings and investment defaults.  
 
 
Introduction  
Over the past few decades, the Australian retirement income system has become increasingly 
privatized and less regulated. The most significant step towards privatization occurred in the 
early 1990s, when the then Labor Government implemented a private-sector managed 
mandatory superannuation1 system to reduce future reliance on a government-funded age 
pension. By mandating the rate of contributions needed to adequately provide for individual 
workers’ retirement, the new policy continued to recognize the paternalistic role of 
government in the pension savings decision. However, in 1996 a change of government saw a 
shift in policy direction. In keeping with the libertarian philosophies of conservative 
governments, the Coalition Government adopted a less paternalistic approach by abandoning 
proposals to increase superannuation contribution rates above the present nine percent, and 
instituted policies and incentives designed to encourage individuals to take responsibility for 
their own retirement savings decisions. This more libertarian approach is reflected in the 
superannuation fund choice legislation enacted in 2004, mandating the offering of greater 
fund choice to superannuation fund members.  
While this new choice-environment provides members with greater control over their own 
retirement savings, it also creates challenges for ensuring superannuation assets are managed 
in way that will maximize investment returns, and ultimately maximize retirement benefits. 
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In attempts to facilitate informed choice, the Government has principally focussed on 
improving disclosures by superannuation funds and on consumer education programs. A 
major hurdle is that, due to behavioural and financial literacy problems, only a small minority 
of superannuation fund members are likely to effectively exercise choice, even if optimal 
disclosure and education policies are successfully implemented. Policy makers and the 
superannuation industry in Australia appear to have largely ignored these important issues in 
their lengthy deliberations over choice.  
In this paper we examine the current policy direction that emphasizes choice as a cornerstone 
to achieving adequate incomes in retirement. We analyse the limitations of the choice 
initiative and whether it is likely to achieve the expected policy outcome of adequate 
retirement savings for Australia’s ageing population. Drawing on recent U.S. research on 
pension members’ behaviour and the libertarian paternalism approach advocated by Thaler 
and Sunstein (2003),2 we offer suggestions for addressing shortcomings of the choice 
initiative.  
Incorporating mandatory private savings into retirement 
income policy  
The World Bank (1994) advocates a three-pillar approach to retirement income policy, with a 
government-provided age pension representing the first pillar, mandatory private retirement 
savings the second pillar, and voluntary retirement savings the third pillar. Australia is one of 
only a few countries that have implemented this three-pillar approach,3 although it is only 
relatively recently that the second pillar – mandatory private savings – was added.  
In the early 1980s, the newly-elected Labor Government identified a need to review the 
sustainability of publicly-funded pensions in the face of an ageing population. There were 
concerns that with rising aged dependency ratios, those in the workforce would become either 
unable or unwilling to pay pensions to an increasing proportion of aged individuals (EPAC, 
1989). Responding to the challenges of these demographic changes, self-provision for 
retirement became a foundation of Australia’s retirement income policy (Dawkins, 1992), 
and the Government pursued strategies for increasing worker participation in superannuation. 
The Superannuation Guarantee (SG) legislation was enacted in 1992 making it mandatory for 
employers to pay superannuation contributions for employees earning more than $450 per 
month. The contribution rate started at four percent of an employee’s salary, rising to nine 
percent by 2002.  
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With the addition of this ‘third pillar’ (mandatory retirement savings) to the Australian 
retirement income system, superannuation coverage expanded to 88 percent of all workers 
and, assets in superannuation funds grew from $135 billion in 1991 to $625 billion in June 
2004 (APRA, 2004). The retirement income policy instituted by the Labor Government 
included plans to increase the superannuation contribution rate from nine to 15 percent,4 but 
this proposal was abandoned in 1997 by the newly-elected Coalition Government (SSCSFS, 
2001). Nevertheless, the superannuation industry and the union movement continue to push 
for increasing the contribution rate to 15 percent (see Clare, 1999 and SSCSFS, 2001).   
Rather than increasing mandatory contributions, the Coalition Government’s strategy for 
bridging “the gap between retirement expectations and likely retirement incomes” is to place 
the onus on individuals to assess their circumstances and make changes if there is an 
‘expectation gap’; such changes include making additional voluntary superannuation savings 
or deferring retirement (Australian Government, 2004: p.6). Thus the present Australian 
government is effectively leaving it to individuals to choose the extent to which they wish to 
increase retirement savings to ensure adequate retirement income levels are achieved. 
Evidence of declining voluntary superannuation savings (see Clare, 1999) suggests this 
voluntary approach will result in many Australians reaching retirement age with insufficient 
superannuation savings to fund an adequate retirement income. Their choice will then be to 
either defer retirement and continue working, or retire and rely on the tax-funded age 
pension. Hazards associated with the first choice include the risk of insufficient employment 
opportunities for older workers, and the risk of poor health in old age precluding continued 
employment. Reliance on the age pension presents the risk of future governments winding 
back access to the age pension as the tax burden of funding this benefit increases with an 
ageing population.  
The move towards greater choice 
The government’s libertarian approach is also extended to giving individuals greater choice 
in the management of their mandatory superannuation savings. In a pre-1996 election 
promise, the Coalition Government announced that it would enact legislation requiring all 
awards and workplace agreements to offer individual workers a choice of up to five 
superannuation funds to which they could direct their employer contributions. The rationale 
for providing such choice was an expectation that it “will increase competition and efficiency 
in the superannuation industry, leading to improved returns on superannuation savings and 
placing downward pressure on fund administration charges” (SSCS, 2002: p. 2). Over a 
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period of eight years the government attempted to pass choice-of-superannuation-fund 
legislation three times. Protracted debates took place within and outside Parliament, including 
two Senate Committee inquiries (see SSCS, 1998 and 2002) and a roundtable discussion (see 
SSCSFS, 2000) involving wide-ranging consultation with superannuation industry leaders 
and other interested parties. Difficulties with reaching a consensus were not that there were 
objections to the choice of fund concept; on the contrary, superannuation choice is generally 
viewed as desirable by non-government political parties, the superannuation industry and 
consumer groups. Objections centred on a perceived lack of adequate consumer protection 
measures, principally relating to inadequate disclosure regulation and concerns about the 
adequacy of financial literacy skills that are necessary for informed decision-making 
(Gallery, Gallery and Brown, 2004). The Government addressed these concerns by allocating 
funding for consumer education and improving disclosure regulation. Sufficient support of 
the minority parties was eventually gained in the Senate and the Superannuation Legislation 
Amendment (Choice of Superannuation Funds) Act 2004 was passed with effect from 1 July 
2005.  
Within the libertarian framework of the retirement income system that will be in place from 
the middle of 2005, Australians will face a hierarchy of three choices in relation to their 
retirement savings. First, individuals will need to evaluate whether their rate of retirement 
saving is adequate to fund their desired retirement income, and then choose whether to make 
additional voluntary contributions towards their superannuation. Second, individuals will 
have to choose into which superannuation fund their compulsory superannuation 
contributions are paid. Third, once a fund is chosen, an individual will need to make a further 
decision about which investment option to choose from a suite of investment options offered 
by their fund.  
If an individual does not exercise choice at one or more of these levels, default options come 
into play. At the first level, the default is no additional voluntary savings, and if the 
superannuation savings are inadequate when the individual reaches retirement age, the 
individual will then have to face another choice of whether to retire and rely on the age 
pension (if available), or continue working. In relation to the second choice, the default fund 
for mandatory superannuation contributions savings is determined by the relevant industrial 
agreement applicable to the individual’s workplace, or if no such agreement exists, the 
individual’s employer must choose the default superannuation fund. In relation to within-fund 
choice of investment, the default investment portfolio must be selected by the fund trustee. 
  5 
The default options in relation to each of these three decision levels have important policy 
implications. Similarly, the necessity for individuals to have the requisite knowledge and 
skills to make informed choices presents significant challenges for policy-makers. However, 
there has been virtually no debate about the even more critical issue of adequate default 
options. The focus has been on questionable consumer education and disclosure initiates.  
Consumer education and disclosure 
As part of the National Strategy for Consumer and Financial Literacy, the Government 
established a Consumer and Financial Literacy (CFL) Taskforce in early 2004. The Taskforce 
identified that “Australia is lacking both an effective framework for understanding consumer 
and financial literacy and an effective structure for improving information provision across 
sectors” (CFL Taskforce, 2004: p.67). It recommended the establishment of a central body 
which would promote and facilitate a coordinated approach to consumer and financial 
information across all sectors of the community, ranging from financial literacy education 
commencing in primary school, to strategies for targeting different groups among the adult 
population.  
This strategic approach may redress financial literacy problems in the long-term, but does not 
offer any solutions for the immediate problem of large numbers of workers who are required 
to make superannuation choices but are ill-equipped to do so. Moreover, while many 
individuals will in the long-term benefit from financial literacy education campaigns to 
enable them to exercise informed choice, there will always be a large core of individuals who 
either do not have the capacity or are unwilling to acquire the necessary knowledge and skills 
to become informed investors (Brown et al, 2002). If an appropriate safety net is not 
established, these individuals will be exposed to the significant risks that their retirement 
savings will be mismanaged or misappropriated. In addition to the cost to the individual, a 
cost will also be borne by future generations of taxpayers if such individuals ultimately rely 
on a tax-funded age pension.  
Those who potentially will not participate in superannuation choice can be categorised into 
three groups. First, there are those who have the capacity to become financially literate and 
willingly participate in education programs, but then do not actually exercise choice. U.S. 
research on the effect of financial investment seminars on pension savings behaviour 
highlights that while many participants indicated intentions to save more or rebalance their 
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investment portfolios, few subsequently followed through with specific action to do so (Choi 
et al, 2002a).  
The second group comprises those who have the capacity to be educated in financial matters, 
but are simply not interested in making active and well-informed financial choices 
(MacFarland, Marconi and Utkus, 2004). A possible explanation for such unwillingness to 
become informed is the costs associated with the effort of acquiring financial knowledge and 
skills, and the further costs of having to continually update and maintain knowledge and 
skills, to enable ongoing monitoring and revisions of past choices (Brown et al, 2002). Such 
costs can be avoided by opting out of making a choice.  
In the third group are those individuals who simply do not have the capacity to acquire and 
maintain the necessary knowledge and skills to make informed superannuation choices. 
Government statistics show that about 20 percent of Australians aged between 15 and 74 
have very poor literacy skills, and up to six million Australians are likely to experience some 
difficulties with reading and understanding printed material encountered in daily life (SSCS, 
2002: 21-22). Without first addressing the problems of basic literacy and numeracy there is 
no prospect that targeting the financial literacy of this group will have any benefit. There are 
also those individuals who have no general literacy problems, but struggle to deal with 
financial matters. Retirement savings and investment choices are complex, needing a good 
understanding of modern portfolio theory to be able to evaluate the relative risks and returns 
associated with alternative investment choices, and an ability to determine the level of 
income that will be needed at some distant date to meet consumption expectations in 
retirement (Arnone, 2004). Even well-educated individuals find superannuation matters 
difficult to understand and are not confident they have the necessary financial skills to choose 
among alternative investment strategies (Gallery, Gallery and Brown, 2000; Brown, Gallery, 
Gallery and Guest, 2004).  
For these three groups of individuals who are unable or unwilling to exercise choice, the 
consequence of not making a choice is to default to no action or a choice made by an agent. 
At the top level of the hierarchy of choices, not exercising choice means no additional 
voluntary savings, the consequence of which is that the level of superannuation accumulated 
through mandatory contributions will not be adequate in retirement. At the next level, if no 
choice is exercised in relation to a superannuation fund, then the default fund that manages 
the retirement assets is nominated in a workplace agreement or selected by the employer. At 
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the third level, if an investment option is not selected, then the superannuation assets are 
invested in the default investment option selected by the fund trustee. Large numbers of 
individuals are likely to fail to exercise choice for all three of these retirement savings 
decisions, resulting in them being automatically assigned a default option that has been 
chosen by an agent. 
It is clear that that Government sees its direct role in consumer education as minimal, and 
considers the superannuation industry and employers have the principal responsibility. Some 
superannuation funds have actively pursued strategies to educate their members in 
superannuation matters, but there is evidence of increasing concerns about fiduciary and legal 
liability associated with giving information and advice (see Towers Perrin, 2003). Unless 
employers and superannuation fund trustees have legislative protection against liability for 
losses associated with investment advice given to superannuation members, as exists in the 
U.S. (see Arnone, 2004), they are unlikely to actively pursue member education programs. 
On the other hand, leaving superannuation education to financial intermediaries in the 
superannuation industry could lead to commission-driven marketing campaigns being 
presented as ‘education’ in attempts to lure members into switching to what in the longer 
term may prove to be unsuitable funds (SSCS, 1998).  
Consumer education is costly and brings with it responsibilities to ensure it is unbiased and 
meets the information needs of decision makers. Moreover, access to relevant and reliable 
information about alternatives in the choice decision is critical for achievement of informed 
choice. Despite recent efforts to improve certain disclosures, there are still widely-held 
concerns within and outside the superannuation industry that superannuation fund disclosure 
rules are inadequate for members to make informed decisions (see SSCS, 2002).5 Even if 
individuals have the required skills and motivation to exercise choice, inadequate disclosure 
may lead to poor decisions. 
Is increased choice the solution for inadequate retirement 
savings?  
Behavioural implications of increased choice 
While issues of education and disclosure have been at the forefront of the choice debate, the 
behavioural implications of choice have received only scant attention. Yet, how individuals 
react when confronted with savings and investment choices is likely to have major long-term 
implications for the success of any private pension system. The underlying economic 
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assumption behind choice is that well-informed economic agents act rationally to optimize 
their consumption and savings patterns across their lifecycle (Modigliani and Brumberg, 
1954). It is argued that as individuals age, they rationally forego current consumption and 
direct savings into optimal investment portfolios consistent with their risk-return preferences 
and planned retirement income needs. Government intervention in the form of unrestricted 
investment choice and taxation and other incentives provide the impetus for individuals to 
achieve their retirement income objectives. However, recent behavioural research has 
identified two major weaknesses in this traditional view. First, rational behaviour is limited 
by the ability of individuals to master complex issues (termed “bounded rationality” by 
Simon, 1955). Individuals may therefore fail to compute the correct savings rate given the 
available investment choices. Second, individuals may have the right savings and investment 
intentions but lack sufficient willpower and self-control necessary to implement their 
intentions (termed “bounded self-control” by Thaler and Shefrin, 1981).  Left unchecked, 
behavioural traits arising from bounded rationality and bounded self-control represent serious 
threats to successful achievement of the savings and investment objectives that form the 
foundation of the Australian government’s retirement income policy.  
Behavioural issues associated with the savings decision  
Thaler and Benartzi (2004) argue that individuals may make inappropriate savings decisions 
for various reasons consistent with the concepts of bounded rationality and bounded self-
control. First, determining the optimal savings rate is a difficult decision involving complex 
estimates about expected lifetime earnings, investment returns, tax rates, retirement age, and 
family and health status. Historically, most Australian retirees have relied on the age pension 
or a defined benefit superannuation plan and therefore, have had little need to determine a 
personal savings rate. Thus there has been no precedent or simple heuristic which individuals 
can use to determine an appropriate savings rate.  
Second, even if individuals realize the necessity to increase savings, they often lack sufficient 
self-control to initiate savings programs. A recent survey of Australian pre-retirees shows that 
only 42 percent believe their current superannuation saving rate will provide the desired level 
of retirement income (ANOP, 2004). This relatively low percentage suggests that many 
Australians have failed to take control of their savings plans. The Australian experience is not 
unique. For example in a U.S. survey, Choi, Laibson, Madrian and Metrick (2002a) reveal 
that 68 percent of their sample of employees considered their saving rate in 401(k) plans6 to 
be too low.  Moreover, the findings of MacFarland, Marconi and Utkus (2004) show that 
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about a half of U.S. pension participants are uninterested in the financial and retirement 
planning activities thought necessary to plan successful retirement. That is, these participants 
are unable to impose the self-control needed to address the savings problem. 
A third and related problem is the human tendency to procrastinate when faced with difficult 
decisions, often to the point of inertia. A contributing factor is the tendency for many 
individuals to incorrectly value future consumption. As a result, they naively place greater 
weight on current and near-term consumption at the expense of longer-term consumption.7 A 
further contributing factor is likely to be the problem of loss aversion: the tendency to place 
greater weight on losses relative to gains (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Thaler and 
Benartzi (2004) argue that once households become accustomed to certain levels of income 
and consumption, they view reductions (including those in the form of savings) as losses. 
Hyperbolic discounting and loss aversion are likely to be more extreme for younger persons 
because of the longer period until retirement, and the tendency for these individuals to be dis-
savers during earlier stages of their lifecycle.  
Procrastination and inertia are commonly evident in surveys of saving intentions. While 
fewer than 50 percent of Australian pre-retirees believe that their current savings would be 
sufficient to cover their retirement needs (ANOP, 2004), only 20 percent of all employees 
make voluntary superannuation contributions (Australian Government, 2004).  Similarly in 
the U.S., Choi et al (2002a) show that one third of those who declared their savings to be too 
low had intended to raise their savings in the next two months, but almost none actually did 
so. When employees are automatically enrolled in voluntary 401(k) pension plans with the 
ability to opt out, the number of new members dramatically increases compared to the 
relatively low rates of participation when employees must actively choose to participate 
(Choi et al, 2002a, 2002b; Madrian and Shea, 2001).  
These findings suggest that although awareness has grown about the need to increase savings, 
problems of self control, procrastination and inertia impede the actual decision, despite the 
best intentions of many individuals and the availability of taxation and other savings 
incentives. The U.S. research on automatic enrolment demonstrates the importance of 
decision framing and default options in the design of voluntary pension saving systems; 
despite the importance of these factors, they have rarely featured in the retirement income 
policy debate in Australia (Gallery, Gallery and Brown, 2004).  
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Behavioural issues associated with the investment decision 
In accordance with modern portfolio theory (MPT), rational investors should hold a 
diversified portfolio that includes the most efficient combinations of securities that optimize 
risk and return (a ‘mean-variance’ portfolio). Mean-variance efficient portfolios should be 
constructed to reflect investor utility preferences and time horizons. Notwithstanding this 
well-accepted theory, bounded rationality and bounded self-control lead to behaviour that 
appears to deviate from MPT. As in the savings decision, procrastination and inertia are 
severe impediments to optimal investment strategies in private pension systems. Additionally, 
a number of behavioural problems specific to a choice environment are likely to hinder the 
formation of mean-variance portfolios, including choice overload, unstable preferences, and 
default heuristics (Gallery et al, 2004; Mitchell and Utkus, 2004).   
A basic principle of MPT is that expanding the investment choice can only lead to 
construction of more efficient portfolios. More efficient portfolios should lead to better 
investment returns for a given level of risk. However, as the number of investment options 
increases, the behavioural research shows that costs associated with sub-optimal investment 
choices also increase (Benartzi and Thaler, 2002). Iyengar and Lepper (2000) identify a 
demotivating effect from too much choice in relation to choice among consumer products. 
Sethi-Iyengar, Huberman and Jiang (2004) extend the choice experiments to retirement plans 
and find that consumers may in fact prefer fewer choices. Indeed, the Sethi-Iyengar et al 
(2004) results show that the demotivating effects of choice overload can lead to lower 
voluntary participation in pension plans.   
Consistent with MPT, the success of Australia’s choice regime requires investors to have 
stable preferences in portfolio selection; however, research evidence suggests that many plan 
participants display relatively weak preferences.  In an experiment involving choices among 
alternative portfolios, Benartzi and Thaler (2002) show that only 20 percent of participants 
preferred their own chosen portfolio to the median portfolio of all participants. When offered 
a portfolio selected by an investment manager (a portfolio option originally offered to all 
participants), 61 percent of participants indicated a preference for the manager’s portfolio 
over their own. These findings suggest that most plan participants do not have stable, well-
defined preferences. That is, they “simply do not have the skills and/or information available 
to pick portfolios that line up with their risk attitudes” (Benartzi and Thaler, 2002: 1595) and 
thus gain little from choosing investment portfolios for themselves (Thaler and Sunstein, 
2003). 
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 The effects of bounded rationality extend to portfolio allocation decisions of investors. In 
results of experiments conducted by Benartzi and Thaler (2001), plan participants tended to 
allocate equal amounts across the portfolio of choices, regardless of the number of choices 
and asset types offered (i.e., they loaded up on equity funds if the plan was loaded up on 
equity funds, etc).8  Benartzi and Thaler (2002) also show that menu-framing problems 
extend to ‘extremeness aversion’: an investor tendency to default to the middle portfolio in a 
menu of choice, regardless of the asset and risk characteristics of this portfolio and the 
alternatives. These tendencies to resort to simple heuristics suggest that plan sponsors may be 
implicitly and detrimentally influencing investment choices through the framing of 
investment menus they offer to members (Benartzi and Thaler, 2002).  
As with the savings decision, problems of procrastination and inertia are commonly observed 
in the decisions of investors once they have elected to participate in a plan. A common 
observation is that many participants remain in default options and those that make active 
selections rarely rebalance their investment portfolios after joining plans. For example, Choi 
et al (2002b) find that over two-thirds of new plan participants invest exclusively in the 
default plan on commencement of employment, with this proportion declining by only a 
relatively small amount to 45 percent three years later. Similarly, Ameriks and Zeldes (2001) 
observe that over a 10-year period, 47 percent of their sample of TIAA-CREF pension plan 
participants made no changes to the asset allocation of new contributions, and 73 percent 
made no changes to the existing allocation of assets in their accounts.  
The Australian evidence is consistent with the U.S. experience. While investment choices 
offered by Australian superannuation funds are generally limited (which should mitigate the 
choice overload problem), only about 10 percent exercise investment choice (Bowman 
2003).9  Thus a large proportion of superannuation fund participants simply choose to remain 
in their fund’s default investment option.  Depending on the participant’s plan, this inertia can 
have significant negative consequences for retirement income. Gallery et al (2004) report a 
wide variation in medium-term performance rates of the default options of top ten funds. 
Among the ‘star-performing’ funds, recent five-year performance ranges from a low of 7.1 
percent to a high of almost double that rate at 13.2 percent. This wide variation among just 
the top ten funds suggests a wide disparity when all funds are considered, and is likely to 
translate into even larger differences across longer time-horizons.  
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  Like the behavioural problems encountered with the savings decision, the observed 
behaviour of individual pension plan participants with respect to their investing decisions 
challenges the notion that decisions are made in accordance rational economic behaviour.  
The important implications are that pension plan design, together with procrastination and 
inertia, can lead to default behaviour that a can have profound effects on retirement incomes.  
The Way Forward – Some Suggested Policy Solutions 
Australia has adopted mandatory private retirement savings as a strategy to achieve the 
objective of adequacy in retirement incomes. However, with the mandatory contribution rate 
set at nine percent and the low level of participation in voluntary superannuation, there is 
growing concern within the superannuation industry that the government’s retirement income 
policy will lead to inadequate funding of the retirement needs of a large number of 
Australians. Effective policy solutions are therefore needed to address the expected shortfall. 
Lessons from the behavioural research on pension saving and investment behaviour offer a 
number of useful insights that can guide more effective policy formulation in relation to 
increasing voluntary savings and achieving desirable investment outcomes.  
One promising way forward is to exploit the behavioural problems of inertia and 
procrastination to increase voluntary retirement savings. Following Thaler and Sunstein’s 
(2003) approach of libertarian paternalism, a possible strategy is to include automatic 
enrolment features in superannuation plans by requiring employers to automatically opt 
employees into voluntary retirement savings schemes. As shown in the U.S., automatic 
enrolment in pension plans significantly increases participation because once individuals are 
‘opted in’ they are unlikely to ‘opt out’. Such commitment devices will potentially be 
effective in increasing voluntary superannuation savings in Australia, provided they are 
supported by clear-cut regulatory guidelines. With respect to investments, guidelines are 
needed to encourage simplified menus of choices offered to superannuation participants to 
avoid problems associated with choice overload, while maintaining a sufficient range of 
choices to facilitate individuals choosing optimal investments.  
Because the vast majority of superannuation fund members do not exercise choice in relation 
to how their mandatory superannuation savings are presently invested, and are unlikely to 
exercise choice when choice of fund legislation comes into effect, establishment of 
appropriate guidelines for default options is urgently needed. As demonstrated by Gallery et 
al (2004), the default investment options across Australian superannuation funds are similarly 
  13 
labelled as ‘balanced’ options, but the five-year investment performance across those options 
varies considerably; this suggests they are very different in their asset composition and risk 
characteristics. As suggested by the SSCSFS (2000), there is a strong case for setting 
minimum standards for default options. In the absence of standardisation of default 
investment options, differences among the default options will inevitably result in significant 
differences in the end retirement benefits of the participants in the different funds. Trustees 
who select poor-performing default options or mislabel the default option (e.g. name a high-
risk portfolio as ‘balanced’) may also be exposed to potentially costly litigation. Similar 
issues arise for employers in relation to the default superannuation fund.  
An alternative to the requirement for a workplace-specific default superannuation fund or 
superannuation fund-specific default investment option is a government-run universal default 
fund (UDF) (Brown et al, 2002; Gallery et al, 2004). A central, professionally-managed UDF 
would provide an appropriate safety net for the superannuation savings of those who are 
unable or unwilling to exercise informed choice. The UDF could also serve as a benchmark 
for evaluating the performance and standards of workplace- and superannuation fund-specific 
default options (Brown et al, 2002).  
With regard to education, it should be recognised that not all individuals have the capacity to 
be educated in financial matters, while others have the capacity but are not interested in 
making active and well-informed financial choices. To address differences in individuals’ 
motivations, MacFarland et al (2004) suggest new educational approaches are needed that 
emphasize simpler decisions and reduce complexities and range of choices.   
The Australian retirement income system is increasingly relying on individuals to choose 
how much they save for their retirement, who manages those savings and how those savings 
are invested. While choice offers the ability to select efficient long-term investment portfolios 
that maximize retirement benefits, poor financial literacy, inadequate disclosure and 
behavioural problems present significant policy challenges. Failure to expediently and 
explicitly address these challenges will potentially result in the present policy approach 
leading to inadequate retirement incomes for many Australians.  
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Notes 
                                                 
1 ‘Superannuation’ is the term used in Australia to refer to employment-related retirement income; the term 
‘pension’ is more commonly used in other countries.   
2 Libertarian paternalism preserves freedom of choice, but where choices may have harmful effects, it authorizes 
both private and public institutions to steer individuals towards decisions that maximize their welfare (Thaler 
and Sunstein, 2003).   
3 Sweden and Chile also have retirement income systems that incorporate all three pillars.  
4 The additional six percent comprised a requirement for employees to contribute three percent and the 
government making a co-contribution of three percent.  
5 Although the Financial Services Reform Act 2001 expanded superannuation disclosures, there are still 
concerns that those disclosures are inadequate and do not permit comparisons between funds (SSCS, 2002), 
principally because the information is not standardised. The Ramsay (2002) report’s recommendations to 
standardise definitions of different types of fees and the calculation of management expense ratios would ensure 
disclosure of comparable information about superannuation fund fees and charges; these recommendations have 
not yet been adopted.  
6  In the U.S., 401(k) plans are employer-based retirement savings plans to which individuals voluntarily 
contribute from their pre-tax earnings; members generally have investment choice.  
7 This behavioural problem is commonly referred to as “hyperbolic discounting” (Thaler and Benartzi 2004).   
8 This behavioural response to portfolio selection is often referred to as the ‘1/n Rule’ (Benartzi and Thaler, 
2001). 
9 Surveys show that 80 percent of superannuation fund members are in funds which allow members to choose 
the type of assets in which their superannuation is invested or offer members a choice of fund managers (Hely 
2004).   
